This article will examine the problem of disease transmission through organ transplantation from a civil liability perspective. Both fault liability and strict product liability might be possible. These two types of liability will be compared, while applying them to the actions of the central parties involved in organ donation and transplantation, namely the physician/hospital, the donor and the organ exchange organisation. While product liability is generally an easier way to obtain compensation than fault liability, it might nevertheless place too heavy a burden on the transplant professionals.
Introduction
Organ transplantation is considered to be the most cost-effective treatment for endstage renal failure and the only available treatment for end-stage failure of organs such as liver, lungs and heart. 1 The success of organ transplantation is reflected by the number of transplants performed annually, as well as the crowded waiting lists.
2 At the same time, these waiting lists reveal a shortage of human organs. The supply of donor organs is clearly insufficient to meet the demand. Organ scarcity has been recognized by the European Commission to be the most important problem of organ transplantation.
3 Not surprisingly, a significant focus of governments and transplant professionals has long been finding ways to increase the number of available organ donors.
However, it must be stressed that donor quantity does not necessarily coincide with donor quality or recipient safety. This is strikingly demonstrated by several cases of (donor derived) disease transmission through organ transplantation (hereafter: DTOT) that have been reported in the past years. Most of these cases centre around two main groups of diseases: infections and malignant neoplasms, better known as cancers. As to infections, organ recipients have already suffered transmission of cytomegalovirus (CMV), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B, hepatitis C and even rabies, to name a few. 4 Transplanted cancers include for instance melanoma, renal cell carcinoma and lung cancer. 5 DTOT events are generally quite rare. 6 Nevertheless, they have been recognized as a clinically significant complication. 7 Indeed, DTOT might result in serious morbidity or even the death of the recipient. Moreover, the common practice of multi-organ procurement, in which a single deceased person can donate his organs to different recipients, might only intensify the impact of DTOT, as one donor source will lead to multiple victims. 8 It is thus worthwhile to take a closer look at this type of transplant event. The most interesting legal issue seems to be the question of civil liability for DTOT. Civil liability is a mechanism that aims to compensate losses by transferring the burden of a loss from one person to another. By passing on costs, liability might also deter certain behaviour and effectuate risk management by whoever is considered liable, assuming no one wants to be liable. This way, liability can also prevent losses. 9 To determine how the goals of compensation and prevention are attained with regard to DTOT, we will map and examine the law on DTOT liability of several countries within the Western European region. We have opted for France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This selection represents both the continental law and the common law tradition, and encompasses countries which all have a well-developed transplant system. As the case law on DTOT within these countries is rather limited, we will additionally draw inspiration from the United States' experiences as well. Unless mentioned otherwise, this study encompasses DTOT as a result of both living and deceased organ donation procedures.
In general, case law and legal doctrine on disease transmission through transfer of human substances revolves around two types of liability: fault liability and strict (product) liability. So firstly we will take a closer look at the features of fault liability in light of the specifics of organ transplantation (part 2). Hereto, attention must be paid to the European Directive 2010/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation 10 (hereafter: Organs Directive). Next, we will continue on to the role of strict product liability, which links liability to the condition of a product rather than a faulty behaviour of the liable person (part 3). More specifically, we will examine the strict product liability as prescribed by the
European Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products
11 (hereafter: Product Liability Directive). Based on the examination of fault liability and strict product liability, we will ultimately conclude by comparing both liability actions in view of providing policy considerations for legislators (part 4).
Fault Liability

Fault liability in general
Overview
DTOT is subject to the general rules of (tortious or contractual) 12 fault liability. Although this type of liability has a different appearance throughout the various European jurisdictions, its core conditions are nevertheless largely common ground. 13 These conditions are threefold: a loss, a fault (violation of the required standard of conduct) and a causal relationship between the loss and the fault. In principle, the plaintiff (in casu the recipient) carries the burden of proof in establishing these elements, although courts have allowed several corrections to this principle (alleviating or even shifting the burden).
14 In the following, we will further examine the requirements of loss (infra 2.1.2.), fault (infra 2.1.3.) and causation (infra 2.1.4.) with a focus on the issues common to all DTOT cases. After this, we will be able to go into detail on the fault liability issues that are specific to the different parties involved in organ donation and transplantation, namely the physician/hospital (infra 2.2.), the donor (infra 2.3.) and the organ exchange organisation (infra 2.4.). 
The loss
First of all, fault liability presupposes a loss. This requires a material or immaterial harm to a legally protected interest (e.g. life, bodily or mental integrity). 16 As such, DTOT could give rise to compensation of inter alia medical expenses, loss of income, physical or moral pain and suffering, or even funeral expenses (as some diseases can lead to the death of the recipient).
17
In certain DTOT cases however, the existence of a harm can be questioned. More specifically, if the recipient surely would have died without transplantation of the diseased organ (because it was the only organ that could possibly be available in time), then doesn't the surviving recipient appears to be better off with than without the diseased transplant? Such reasoning was apparently followed by the defendants in the French Calmettes case, who argued that the plaintiffs did not prove their losses seeing that the infected liver transplant saved the recipient's life. The Parisian court ultimately ruled in favour of the defendants by considering inter alia that the recipient would have died without the transplant. However, the French court did not explicitly state that the plaintiffs did not suffer a harm or loss. 18 To predict the course that courts will take in DTOT cases, where absolutely no lifesaving alternative apart from a diseased organ transplant was available, a comparison can be drawn with the case law on wrongful life claims. These revolve around the same question, namely whether life with a disease as the alternative to non-life can constitute a harm. 19 For instance, in Belgium, the possibility of wrongful life claims has recently been rejected by the Supreme court, 20 so a similar course can be expected regarding DTOT. However, if the recipient chose or would have chosen death over living with the transmitted disease, then it will probably be argued on the basis of patient autonomy that the consequences of living with this disease do become a reparable harm (wrongful prolongation of life claim). 
The fault
Next, the organ recipient must find a person that can be held liable on the basis of a fault, either his own or one of his auxiliaries 22 (e.g. the hospital for the conduct of an employed physician). This is not an easy task, as an organ transplantation procedure entails the actions of several different agents (see infra 2.2., 2.3. and 2.4.). The existence of a fault 14 Ibid. 630-634. 15 This article will not focus on the parties that are not directly involved in the transplantation procedure (e.g. the government or the person whose fault created the need for a transplant), although we do not rule out this liability. 16 19 A wrongful life claim is a legal action in which the defendant is sued by a seriously disabled child (represented by its legal guardian) for allowing the child to be born and thus failing to prevent a disabled life. The legal action in which parents sue the defendant for their own damages resulting from this birth is called a wrongful birth claim. 20 Cass. 14-11-2014, no. C.13.0441.N, www.juridat.be. depends on the standard of conduct (or duty of care) that is required for the agent in question. Generally, the required standard is that of the reasonable person in the circumstances of the case (e.g. value of the protected interest, expertise of that person, foreseeability of the loss, costs of precautions). 23 Underlying this standard is the blameworthiness of that person's conduct, which seems to be commonly accepted as a good reason to pass on the recipient's costs. 24 Reasonableness is of course a very broad template and will need to be specified in the light of the specifics of DTOT.
In this regard, we cannot overlook the European Organs Directive. This directive provides a flexible, but binding legal framework, which compels EU member states to implement some specific quality and safety measures for organ transplantation in their national legislation. 25 It can be accepted in principle that a reasonable person abides by statutory rules. Therefore, rules which prescribe or forbid certain conduct, such as those of the implemented Organs Directive, have to be considered when establishing the required standard of conduct.
26
As the assessment of a fault pertains to a highly specific and technical matter, expert testimony will be of significant value. However, experiences from the United States reveal that this could be a hurdle. The transplant community is rather small. If expert qualifications were to be drawn too narrowly (e.g. only physicians specializing in transplants) then it might be hard to find an expert willing to testify against a 'colleague' who only did what everyone else was doing. 
Causation
Finally, only a fault that caused the loss of the recipient can lead to liability. Causation requires proof that the recipient's loss would not have occurred without the faulty conduct (conditio sine qua non).
28 Direct proof of causation exists when it can be demonstrated that the donor derived material was contaminated and that one or more recipients are now inflicted with that same contamination, while this was not yet the case before transplantation. 29 However, establishing causation in DTOT cases is often considered to be an obstacle, since the damage will usually not present itself immediately upon transplantation, making transplant-unrelated causes (e.g. through sexual contacts) theoretically possible as well. 30 In the absence of direct proof, recipients will thus have to rely on an indirect proof by excluding 23 Article 4:102(1) PETL. 24 See also: Koch, supra note 12, 628. 25 According to Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter: TFEU), a directive shall be binding as to the result to be achieved, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. The competence of the EU to enact legislative measures on the quality and safety of organs is contained in Article 168, al. 4 (a) TFEU. 26 Having discussed the three conditions for fault liability, we can now turn to some specific issues relating to the different parties involved, starting with the physicians and hospitals. Throughout the transplantation procedure, they are responsible for performing several actions which might constitute a fault if the standard of conduct is not met. To start, physicians must naturally procure the organ in the donor hospital. According to Article 7, al. 1 of the Organs Directive, this procurement must be accompanied by an action called 'donor and organ characterisation'. This is basically the collection of all relevant information on the donor and the organ necessary to undertake a proper risk assessment and to optimise organ allocation, 34 which of course includes information on disease transmission risks. The duty of characterisation entails several sub-duties: interviewing the donor or his relatives, submitting donor samples to tests in qualified laboratories, a physical examination (e.g. radiological tests or visual inspection) and reviewing the donor medical records. 35 This way, the Organs Directive has clearly established a standard of conduct to which non-compliance could lead to fault liability.
Still, the scope of the characterisation duties is left open for interpretation. Although the Annex to the Organs Directive specifies which information should be gathered, the data in part B of the Annex only needs to be collected if the physicians decides so, taking into account availability of the information and the particular circumstances of the case. 36 The minimum data in part A of the Annex is obligatory, but even when not all minimum data is available, organ transplantation may still be performed when the expected benefits for the recipient outweigh the risks posed by incomplete data. 37 So fault liability for failing to search for and discover donor diseases will only be at hand if the physician fails to strike the right balance between the benefits and risks of further data collection. The large variety of potential pathogens and detection methods precludes a detailed discussion of this balancing act. Instead, we will consider the three main parameters in order to determine whether the DTOT risk should have been known.
A first important parameter is the urgency of the procurement procedure. Organ procurement from a deceased donor for transplantation purposes should generally be done as soon as possible, due to the rapid deterioration of organs after death. The less time available, the fewer characterisation measures that can be taken. Otherwise, this might lead to wasting urgently needed organs. 38 In the French Poussardin case for example, the Conseil d'État rejected the liability of the donor hospital for failing to perform a confirmatory hepatitis C test on a brain-dead heart donor when primary testing inconclusively revealed a number of antibodies, seeing that the transplant was urgently needed. 39 Likewise, the Parisian court decided in the Véronique case (hepatitis B infection through liver transplantation) that the lack of confirmatory testing did not constitute a fault, because the recipient urgently needed the liver and the testing would have taken too much time. 40 Secondly, the nature of the risk should be taken into account. This mainly pertains to the risk probability. In general, testing for diseases with low incidence (e.g. rabies) 41 is not cost-effective and is difficult to maintain. 42 However, if signs of such diseases reveal themselves, these diseases can become foreseeable and thus require more extensive examination. 43 Logically, failing to characterize risks that were unknown by medical science (e.g. new diseases or known diseases in a new context) at the time of procurement will not constitute a fault. 44 Last but not least, a third parameter we wish to highlight is the effectiveness of characterisation methods. In general, the causation requirement implies that only the failure to take precautions that could have prevented the harm can lead to fault liability. 45 For some diseases (e.g. HIV and hepatitis C), tests exist, but their effectiveness is limited to a certain stage in the development of the disease. Before this moment, there is a so-called 'window period', in which the disease is already present in and transmissible by the donor, but cannot be discovered yet. 46 Obtaining false negative test results due to the window period -during which in fact no test is available -would not constitute a fault. 47 In general, the standard of conduct does not require the discovery of diseases that cannot be discovered. Not surprisingly, it is said that the risk of false negatives attaches considerable importance to screening for risks through donor history. 48 However, interviewing might also be unreliable, as respondents might forget to mention things, might not understand the question, or just do not know. 49 Furthermore, visual inspection of the organ cannot always reveal the cancer (e.g. malignancies located deeply inside a large organ or micrometastases). 50 Of course, if the ineffectiveness of the characterisation method is caused by a fault (e.g. mislabelling, test sample mix-up, improperly performing tests, unclear communication 51 ), then this might yet lead to liability of the medical team, the laboratory personnel or the hospital. 52 
Organ selection
After having performed the characterisation, the physician will need to decide whether to accept the organ (organ selection). 53 In France and Belgium, some courts established a 'safety obligation' that encompasses the selection and provision of blood and other tissues free of defects such as infections. Such an obligation was considered to be an 'obligation of result', which means that the provider breaches the standard of conduct as soon as the recipient proves that the selected blood or tissue was contaminated. The provider could only escape liability by disproving causation between this fault and the recipient's loss, regardless of whether the contamination could have been discovered. 54 By contrast, the EU Organs Directive supports a rather large margin of appreciation for the clinician to determine the appropriate risk-benefit ratio in accepting an organ for transplantion. It acknowledges that more risks can be accepted than with blood or most tissues and cell-based treatments because overall benefits of organ transplantation are high. 55 This allows for non-standard risk donors (also called 'expanded criteria donors' or 'marginal donors') to be used; a policy choice which is convenient in view of the organ shortage. 56 Thus, transplanting an organ that causes or could cause DTOT is not necessarily faulty conduct. 57 Fault liability will not be withheld unless it is proven that the risk-benefit ratio is unreasonable given the circumstances.
Two sets of parameters are especially relevant for judging the reasonableness of the organ selection decision. The first set relates to the disease itself. Attention should be given to its treatability. For example, CMV is highly susceptible to transmission and has the potential to cause significant morbidity. Nevertheless, prophylaxis is possible, thereby reducing the actual risk, which pleads in favour of transplantation. 58 Another factor is the transmission probability of the disease. For example, the low foreseeable risk that the donor might be infected with hepatitis B was one of the elements taken into account by the French court in the Poussardin case to reject negligence for transplanting an infected heart. 59 The second set of parameters revolves around the condition of the recipient. One of these factors is the pre-existence of the disease in the recipient. Whereas for example a hepatitis C-infected donor should principally be excluded, it is nevertheless accepted that his organs could be used for recipients who are already infected with hepatitis C (viral positiveto-positive transplantation). 60 Similarly, the law in the United States has recently been changed in order to allow HIV-positive donors for HIV-positive recipients in an attempt to reduce organ shortage, even though the risks of this type of matching are still partly unknown. 61 The urgency of the transplantation, which also depends on the lack of alternatives, is a relevant factor as well. For example, the court in the French Poussardin case rejected liability for transplanting an infected heart inter alia on the ground that, in the absence of therapeutic alternatives, the heart transplant was urgently needed to save the recipient's life. 62 In the Texan Hightower case, the court even seems to consider that transplantation of a kidney with a high risk for HIV and hepatitis C is not negligent, because the operation was not unnecessary, although it could have waited as the recipient's kidney failure was under control thanks to dialysis therapy. 63 Indeed, dialysis could serve as an alternative for kidney transplants, but non-standard kidney donors could still provide much better outcomes and might thus be justified, depending on the extent of the risk in the specific case. 
Informed consent
While transplanting a diseased organ may prove to be in accordance with the standard of conduct, this does not preclude liability of the transplant physician for failing to fulfil his duty to obtain the recipient's informed consent. This means that he will have to inform the recipient about known or reasonably expectable DTOT risks. 65 However, this duty does not mean that every possible transmission risk should be disclosed in detail as this would be impractical and unnecessary to guarantee self-determination by the recipient. liability was sought for failing to inform on the known CMV-positive status of a heart-lung donor. The court dismissed this claim on the basis that a reasonable medical practitioner following the practice of the nationwide transplant community would not have disclosed this risk, as heart-lung donors are rare and a lot of donors are CMV-positive. 66 Some remarks are necessary. Firstly, the court in Good appears to be judging by a professional standard of conduct. We believe that there is no reason to rely solely on professional guidelines and practices to this extent, for this would allow transplant surgeons to make their own rules and could easily undermine knowledgeable decision-making by the recipient. The standard should logically be the reasonable, prudent recipient/decision-maker. 67 Next, the court apparently relied on the high frequency of the (CMV) risk. However, not only risk frequency, but also the seriousness of the risk should reasonably be taken into account.
68
On its own, high risk frequency is rather an argument in favour of disclosing the risk. 69 For example, the fact that a lung donor smoked cigarettes daily for over a decade would appear to be information that a reasonable recipient would like to know with a view to the risks of lung cancer.
70 Therefore, instead of relying on the high prevalence of CMV donors, the court in Good would have provided a better argument to dismiss liability by stating that CMV is easily controlled and thus forms a not so serious risk.
Committing a fault by failing to inform the recipient on the DTOT risk is in itself not enough for fault liability. Causation between the lack of disclosure and the organ transplantation is also required.
71 Basically, the recipient has to show that he would not have consented if the missing information had been disclosed. 72 The urgency of the transplant can play an important role in assessing this causation. In the Poussardin case for example, failing to inform the heart recipient about the hepatitis B risk did not give rise to fault liability according to the French court, because the recipient would still have undergone the transplantation if informed, as it was urgently needed to save his life. 73 In Ord v. Regents of the University of California, a lack of causation between CMV-infection and failure to inform on the CMV-positive status of a transplanted lung was found for yet another reason. Since the recipient was advised face-to-face and via a booklet about many serious infections other than CMV, some of which were more serious than CMV, the court held that a reasonable, prudent person in those circumstances would not decline a transplant due to an increased risk of CMV infection. Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA 2006) 75 even grants immunity for civil action to the person who makes a deceased donation (the donor or his family) and to the donor's estate for any injury or damage that results from the making or the use of the gift. 76 The comment to section 18 UAGA 2006 explains that donor immunity is based on the view that those who donate have little ability to determine the risks associated with transplantation, so risk assessment should be appropriately left to the medical community. We agree with the idea that the duty for risk assessment should be placed upon those who have superior information, as this would be more efficient in view of risk prevention. 77 We also agree with the view that, as a starting point, the living or deceased donor has insufficient knowledge for adequate risk assessment. However, we believe that this does not necessarily mean that an organ donor can never be liable. If it can be established that the (living) donor knows that his situation implies a risk or should have known this, but fails to alert the medical team during the interview, then this would be a fault which could lead to liability. 78 The same goes for the next of kin (or other persons) who are questioned in view of deceased organ donation.
The organ exchange organisation
Usually, a designated organ exchange organisation will control the allocation of procured organs to compatible recipients. In the French Calmettes case, the plaintiffs addressed the former French organ exchange organisation (France Transplant, represented by the Établissement Français des greffes) on the basis of fault liability for a liver transplantation which allegedly caused a hepatitis C infection. The Parisian court held that no fault could be established, seeing that, according to its statutes and government contract, this organisation only had a duty of transferring the necessary information between hospitals and coordinating the procedure, instead of examining the condition of the organ or double-checking the characterisation measures. 79 A similar view was implicitly shared in the US case of Kelly v. New York Organ Donor Network, where the court considered that the Organ Procurement Organization does not make any clinical judgment but only collects and transfers the medical information between hospitals and coordinates the procedure. 80 For the reasons stated in this case law, it is probably not worthwhile to address organ exchange organisations in DTOT cases on the basis of fault liability. However, this does not preclude their liability completely. If the exchange organisation negligently failed to perform its duties (e.g. correct, bonafide information transfer) and this led to an incorrect clinical judgment, which in turn led to DTOT, then their fault liability does need to be examined. It is imperative to examine the scope of the mission of the relevant exchange organisation in each instance. 75 To be found at: http://www.uniformlaws.org. 76 Similarly, by upholding the principle of anonymity with regard to deceased donors and living donation by strangers, some jurisdictions (e.g. Article 4bis Belgian law of 13 June 1986 relating to the removal and transplantation of organs, BS 14-02-1987 or Article L1211-5 French Code de la Santé Publique), appear to have created a de facto immunity, as the recipient might not know who to sue. 77 See also: Eckert, supra note 9, 218-219. 78 This tallies with the Belgian and Dutch majority position on the liability of blood donors: H.J.J. Leenen 
Strict product liability
Strict product liability in general
An interesting question is whether strict product liability rules can be applied in situations of a DTOT-victim. As mentioned above, a specific Directive concerning strict product liability is applicable in the EU. The aim of the Product Liability Directive was to adjust the laws of the EU Member States concerning the liability of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his products 'because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property.' 81 It is clear that consumer protection is one of the main objectives of this Directive. 82 The application of the Directive would require the recipient to prove that his damage is caused by a defective product and that the addressed person is the producer/supplier of that product. 83 Applied to a situation of DTOT, the victim has to prove that an organ is a product (infra 3.2). Secondly, the organ should be considered as being a defective product (infra 3.3) Finally, the addressed person should be the producer/supplier of the organ (infra 3.4). The issue of damages and the question with regard to causality are already discussed earlier in this article. 84 The European Directive on product liability does not contain a specific definition of the concept of causality so this should get the common (national) interpretation. Concerning the damage, the Product Liability Directive imposed specific conditions with respect to property damage 85 but the remainder is left to the national courts in accordance with their national law. 86 For this reason, we will not further discuss these principles in this part.
An organ as a product 3.2.1. Notion
The first obstacle that the DTOT-victim must overcome, is the proof that an organ is a product within the meaning of the applicable legislation. 87 The regulations on product liability in Europe as well as in the USA logically apply only to products.
The Product Liability Directive defines a product as 'all movables even if incorporated into another movable or into an immovable'. 88 This way, the Directive applies to a very wide range of products. 89 However, some consider that the Directive can only be applied to industrially manufactured products, as the recitals to the Directive seem to suggest. 90 This statement cannot be followed. 91 In the first place, it should be noticed that the clear wording of Article 2 Product Liability Directive does not make a distinction relating to the method of producing a product. Moreover, the European Commission responded explicitly to a parliamentary question that the Directive should for example also apply to craft and artistic products. 92 Finally, we believe it is justified -given the purpose of consumer protection -to argue that the concept of a product should be interpreted very broadly.
Regarding human material, it must be assumed that parts of the body that can be removed -such as blood, tissues and sperm -are undeniably movable goods and therefore fall within the meaning of the product concept. 93 As for France, we can even refer to the hereinafter discussed 'development risk defence' 94 which is explicitly excluded for damage resulting from defective bodily material. 95 A contrario, we must conclude that bodily material as such does initially fall within the scope of the Directive. 96 Furthermore, in the well-known English blood case, A v. National Blood Authority, the judge said that blood and blood products fall within the scope of the Directive. 97 This proposition should be nuanced in that only bodily material which is separated from the human body can be considered as being a product. 98 The person himself cannot be seen as a movable good as long as he is alive. Thus, as long as bodily material is part of the human body, it is not a movable good 99 and consequently not a product within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive. Nevertheless, the fact that the bodily material -for example the organ after the transplantation -becomes a part of the recipient's body does not alter this statement. For example, in several blood cases as well as in cases relating to medicines, it was never stated that a product which caused the damage is no longer a product because of its 'absorption' into the body. 100 In our opinion, the same can be said of an organ transplant.
The internal market argument
Some case law and scholars consider that organs are not products within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive. 101 In their opinion, this allegation can be justified by one of the objectives of the Directive, namely the creation of an internal market. According to them, organ transplantation has little or even nothing to do with this internal market so an organ cannot be regarded as being a product.
This statement cannot find any support. The idea that organs and organ transplantation have nothing to do with the internal market is false. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU does have competence within the field of quality and safety of human organs for transplantation, so such services fall within the scope of the internal market.
102 Thus, organ transplantation does fit within the achievement of the internal market. In addition, this reasoning is contrary to the clear wording of Article 2 Product Liability Directive, in which the concept of a product is defined very broadly. 103 Taking into account this definition, it must be accepted that organs -like all other bodily material -are a product.
The product-services distinction
It can be questioned whether an organ transplant is a service rather than a product. This is for example the position in the USA. In most American blood cases, it is stated that the transfusion of blood should be considered as being a service and not as a product. 104 The same can be said in case of organs and organ transplants. 105 The use of bodily material as a product is in fact subordinate to the primary element of the service; in other words: the providing of health care as a service overrides the occasional provision of products. 106 One goes to the hospital to obtain a service -i.e. health care -and not to purchase a product. 107 That way, any kind of strict product liability has to be excluded, according to the majority in the American case law and the doctrine. Only in very exceptional -and strongly criticized 108 -cases, bodily material was regarded as being a product. 109 Nevertheless, in most States of America, legislation was enacted to protect hospitals and blood banks from strict liability. 110 These are the so-called 'blood shield statutes'. 111 A reading of this legislation reveals that in most States, other bodily material -such as organs -also falls within the scope of these statutes so strict product liability is not possible in those situations. 112 In the Third Restatements on Torts, it is also explicitly mentioned that blood and other human bodily material are not products within the meaning of the Restatements. 113 For example, a heart valve for transplantation cannot be considered as being a product. 114 The policy reasons behind this are to avoid a decrease in the number of donors and to avoid medical science being limited as a result of (too) strict liability. 115 In other words, the blood supply -and by extension any provision of any form of bodily material -may not be jeopardized by the imposition of strict product liability. 116 Concerning the European Union by contrast, it can undeniably be argued that the Product Liability Directive is applicable when a product is used in the context of a service. 117 This follows from the Henning Veedfald case, which was about a kidney that became unsuitable for transplantation after being rinsed with a defective perfusion fluid produced by the hospital itself. In a short but very clear decision, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Product Liability Directive should apply to products used within the context of a service. The Court stated that it is sufficient to observe that the case involved the defectiveness of a product -used in the course of providing a service -and not any defect in the service as such. 118 When we apply this to the problem of DTOT, it can undeniably be argued that the Directive applies to organs because they are a product as soon as they are separated from the human body. 119 The fact that these are used in the course of providing a service -namely the organ transplantation -does not affect this statement. The Directive is also applicable to these products, as long as the case involves the defectiveness of the product and not any defect in the service as such. The service itself undeniably falls outside the scope of the Directive. However, it should be noted that in practice it will not always be that easy to distinguish between a defectiveness in the product and a defect in the service as such. A second hurdle the plaintiff must overcome is the proof of defectiveness. As already mentioned, the producer is only liable for the damages caused by a defect in his product. 121 The standard of liability is the defectiveness of the product and not the negligence or fault of the producer. According to the European legislator, a form of strict liability is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production. 122 The producer is best placed to bear such costs as he can pass them on to all consumers by increasing the price of the product. 123 According to the drafters of the Directive, a fair apportionment of risks between the injured person and the producer implies that the latter should be able to free himself from liability in certain exonerating circumstances.
124 Therefore, Article 7 Product Liability Directive provides a limited number of defences that free the producer from liability. In addition, it should be pointed out that the producer cannot invoke any contract limiting or exempting him from liability.
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According to Article 6 Product Liability Directive, a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account. Generally, it must be assumed that the defectiveness of a product must be assessed on a caseby-case basis, taking into account all relevant circumstances, on the basis of objective criteria. 126 In doing so, the court has a wide margin of appreciation.
127
Some scholars -with regard to sperm -believe that one may not have high safety expectations in case of an unknown infection risk so that this risk should be borne by the recipient. 128 In the same vein, other authors pleaded for a separate product liability regime for blood products. 129 This would mean that a blood product can only be considered as defective from the moment the virus can be detected. As long as the situation concerns a known risk that cannot be detected, the producer should only warn of the potential risks.
However, the majority of authors has held that the general public is entitled to expect that transfused blood is completely safe. 130 This doctrine considers that one can speak of flawed blood even if there is an absolutely unknown virus in the infused blood. 131 The same statements can be found in different case law. For example, the English court ruled in the well-known case of A v. National Blood Authority that the general public has the right to expect that blood is perfectly safe, although one is usually aware of the fact that there is always a (small) risk of contamination. 132 A Dutch court was already of the opinion that the general public may expect that blood products are 100% HIV-free. 133 Some Belgian authors also believed that HIV-contaminated blood should be considered to be defective. 134 Finally the German court -regarding the inevitable risk of the explosion of glass bottles -considered that the public is entitled to expect absolute safety regardless of the fact that certain defects may not always be detectable. 135 In our view, this reasoning will probably also be applied to the situation of DTOT. In other words: the general public may in principle expect that the transplanted organ is free of any defect.
The presentation of the product
The presentation of the product is one of the specific circumstances that should be taken into account in the safety assessment. 136 This means that the product must be regarded taking into account the packaging, the instructions, the warnings, etc. 137 It is generally accepted that inaccurate, incomplete or missing information renders a product defective. 138 Especially in the case of an inherently dangerous product -such as most medical products -the information about any possible risk is essential in the safety assessment. 139 Applying this to the situation of DTOT, we can argue that the patient should be informed about all known possible dangers inherent to organ transplantation. 140 Comparing this with the above discussed information obligation (informed consent), one might conclude that there is little or no distinction between strict product liability and fault liability. This statement is correct to a certain extent: the provision of incorrect, incomplete or insufficient information is a fault and renders the product defective. However, it should be noted that strict product liability demands that all known risks are communicated, even the very exceptional ones which a normal prudent person would eventually not communicate. For this reason, we believe that the application of the Product Liability Directives offers greater protection concerning the information obligation compared with the fault liability.
Even if information is given, this does not mean that an organ can no longer be considered as defective. It remains possible that the information and warnings do not remove the unsafe nature of the product if the legitimate expectations of the general public were higher. 141 Even the presence of an exhaustive list of warnings and possible dangers does not guarantee that a particular product is safe. For example, the Court of Amsterdam ruled that a blood product contaminated with HIV was defective, although the brochure from the blood bank and various media mentioned the possibility of HIV-infection through blood transfusion. 142 However, we opt for a more nuanced approach. We believe that sufficient adequate information of all the potential risks of a transplant can transform the initial defective organ into a safe product. This can be justified by the fact that an organ transplantation is very useful and even lifesaving, though it can include some unavoidable risks. Nevertheless, this information requirement should be interpreted very strictly. Thus, we concur with the case law which believes that the producer has to warn of any known side-effect and risk, even if their occurrence is statistically very low. 143 The case law which is satisfied with mentioning the most dangerous risks cannot be followed. 144 Still, we should emphasise that the provision of (sufficient appropriate) warnings in itself is not an absolute defence for the producer. As indicated, it remains possible that the judge finds there is an unsafe product if the legitimate expectations of the public justify this.
The development risk defence
Finally, the producer is not liable if the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. Within the medical context, in which such risks are inherently present, this so-called development risk defence deserves particular attention. 145 The development risk defence has to be interpreted strictly. 146 According to the European Court of Justice, the producer must prove that the accessible objective 147 state of scientific and technical knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge at the time when the product in question was put into circulation, was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. 148 There are three possible interpretations of this defence in relation to bodily material.
In the first instance, there is the French view. In France, the defence is expressly excluded in relation to human body parts and products derived from them. 149 It seems this defence is interpreted too rigorously for the producer.
Secondly, in the blood case A v. National Blood Authority, the English court held that, since the infection of transfused blood with hepatitis C occurred before and had been clearly documented, the producer knew this danger. For that reason, the development risk defence was not applicable when there is knowledge of the possible existence of the defect even if there are no functional tests available to detect this defect in specific products. 150 The same reasoning was applied in an obiter dictum in the case Richardson v. LRC Products concerning a ruptured condom. 151 Also the German Court -in the case of an exploding water bottleheld that the defence only covered undetectable dangers. 152 To summarize, it can be said that as soon as a possible risk is known, the producer can no longer invoke the development risk defence because of this knowledge of the risk. 153 A technical inability to detect a particular risk does not give rise to the application of this defence. 154 This reasoning can additionally be justified through the objective of consumer protection: the stricter the defence is interpreted, the more protection a victim of a defective product receives. Thus, if a defective organ is transplanted, the producer cannot rely on this defence if the risk of such a defect is known, regardless of whether the defect could be discovered in that particular case.
Finally, the district Court of Amsterdam, dealing with a case of infected blood, did find the fact that the HIV infection could not be detected during a certain phase of the disease, sufficient to allow the development risk defence. 155 Some scholars believe this judgement is wrong as the development risk defence is only about the recognisability of a risk and not about the 'avoidability' of this risk. 156 Nonetheless, the Dutch Court was in our opinion not totally wrong by stating that the development risk defence could be invoked when the defect could not be discovered in a particular case. This can be supported by the clear wording of Article 7, e) Product Liability Directive. It states that the producer is not liable if he proves that the state of knowledge was not such as to enable the 'existence of the defect to be discovered'. Linguistically, it can be argued that even in a situation where a certain risk is known but cannot be detected in a specific product, one can rely on the development risk defence.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the donor is always the supplier of his/her bodily material. However, this still does not mean that the donor will be held liable in practice. 167 In order to achieve full protection of the donor and to avoid a decrease in the number of donors, one can argue that the donor may at any time invoke the defence of Article 7, c) Product Liability Directive. 168 One is not liable when he proves that the defective product was neither manufactured by him for sale or for any form of distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed by him in the course of his business. As the donor's body parts are not produced/supplied for any form of distribution for economic purpose -having regard to the prohibition of the commercialisation of human bodily material 169 -nor distributed in the course of any business, the donor cannot be held liable under the Directive. This defence can be invoked regardless of whether the donor is considered as being the producer or the supplier. Even if the donor would receive a reimbursement for expenses and income loss, this does not mean that the donor distributes the product for economic purposes. 170 However, in the exceptional case of criminal organ trade, the donor cannot invoke this defence anymore. In that situation, the donor will after all act with an economic purpose. This is justified from the perspective that in this way the Product Liability Directive has a deterrent effect on organ trafficking.
The organ exchange organisations
Further, we can briefly discuss the status of the so-called allocation organisations. It must be assumed that they are neither a producer nor a supplier within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive. This can be derived from certain case law which has shown that these organisations usually have a coordinating and administrative function without really being involved in the removal and/or transplantation of organs. 171 For this reason, it is not recommended to consider these organisms as producers/suppliers.
The physician and the hospital
Some scholars believe that the hospital or physician who provides an organ can be considered as being the supplier of the product, as it is impossible for the patient to determine who is the producer of this bodily material. 172 Other authors believe that it would be 'perverse' to say that the prevailing or transplanting hospital/physician should be considered as being the producer of the organ. 173 However, in several blood cases, the blood bank was usually held liable as a producer of the blood. 174 Furthermore, some scholars have even argued that any agent that procures bodily material, in view of providing this to a patient, should be considered as being the producer within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive. 175 It is also accepted that the physician who mixes certain drugs for an injection has to be seen as the producer of this finished product. 176 In the same way, it is stated that the doctor who changes an intravenous drug has to be regarded as being a producer. 177 Even a laboratory that distributes human bodily material within the framework of its professional activities must be regarded as being the producer of this material. 178 Finally, we can mention the European Product Safety Directive, which entails a lot of preventive and corrective measures to ensure the safety of the users and to avoid risks or correct them. 179 Within the meaning of this Directive, the producer is every professional in the supply chain, insofar as his activities may affect the safety properties of a product. 180 As the Product Safety Directive and the Product Liability Directive have a complementary function -namely harmonizing the rules for producing and marketing safe products and achieving a high level of consumer protection 181 -an identical scope for both Directives seems to be desirable.
Based on this, we can state that the physician and/or the hospital must be regarded as being the producer of an organ in the context of organ transplant. 182 In a similar way, it has already been argued that a person acquires the status of producer by processing bodily material or parts of it. 183 The physician and the hospital process an organ before transplantation in the way, for example, that they store and rinse the organ (with certain fluids) before it can actually be transplanted. This preparation of the organ should be considered as part of the production process so it seems plausible to consider the hospital/the physician as a producer. 184 By processing the organ, the hospital/the physician 'manufacture' a finished product for transplantation. 185 It will probably be the team that procures the organ that should be considered as being the producer but it can also be the transplanting team. In other words: the team that processes the organ can be considered as the producer; otherwise they can only be considered as the supplier.
Unlike the donor, the hospital/the physician do act with an economic purpose and within the framework of their business so they cannot rely on the defence of Article 7, c) Product Liability Directive. Furthermore, they cannot invoke the defence of Article 7, a) Product Liability Directive which states that the producer is free from liability if he did not put the product into circulation. In the Henning Veedfald case, it has explicitly been held that a product is put into circulation when it is used during the provision of a specific medical service, consisting of preparing a human organ for transplantation, though it never left the medical sphere of control. 186 Thus, the use of a product for the benefit of a third party means that this product is put into circulation. 187 Since the European Court of Justice said that a perfusion fluid used to prepare a human organ for transplantation is put into circulation, it must be assumed that the (flawed) organ itself -which is prepared for transplant -is also put into circulation.
188 After all, it is not relevant that the product did not leave the hospital. 189 For that reason, we believe that the producer of a defective organ may not rely on this defence.
Overall conclusion
The purpose of this article was to determine how the liability goals of compensation and prevention are attained with regard to DTOT in order to provide policy considerations for legislators. For this, we examined both fault liability regimes and the European strict product liability regime. As to the application of fault liability for DTOT, we can conclude that this is not a particularly recipient-friendly means of providing compensation for the loss of the recipient. The burden of proof relating to faulty conduct and causation is quite heavy. Locating faulty conduct is especially hampered by the complexity of the organ transplantation procedure. A lot of different parties are involved and many of their actions are technical actions which require expert insight in order to be verified. The parties most easily targeted for liability claims are obviously the medical teams and hospitals. However, they are generally granted a rather wide margin of appreciation, which often makes it difficult to label their conduct as faulty. Furthermore, the fact that often other factors than the organ transplant could theoretically explain the disease contraction provides an easy defence for the defendant. Consequently, achieving prevention of DTOT risks is possible, but limited by these hurdles as well.
As to the application of strict product liability for DTOT, the recipient might still have difficulties in establishing causation. Yet, the recipient will no longer carry the burden of proving faulty conduct. Instead, he will have to establish the defectiveness of the organ, which will be easier. As we have seen, it will probably be rather difficult for the medical team or the hospital to free themselves from strict product liability for DTOT. Thus, it appears that strict liability will be much more recipient-friendly in view of providing compensation for the DTOT related losses. Consequently, strict product liability will provide a stronger incentive for prevention of DTOT risks. However, the European product liability regime might even lead to the liability of the medical team or hospital when it was impossible to prevent DTOT. Instead of creating beneficial incentives for prevention, strict product liability might thus deter transplant professionals from performing some transplants entirely, which could be detrimental to patients on the organ waiting lists. 190 A more flexible interpretation of the requirements for product liability would lower deterrence, but would lower chances for recipient compensation at the same time. We hope that these insights may guide legislators in defining their policy on quality and safety of human organs for transplantation.
